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n Book I of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason Kant offers an explanation of freedom and moral 
good and evil that is different from that offered in the 
Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals. My primary goal in 
this paper is to analyze and elucidate this new theory. My 
secondary goal is to contrast this new theory with the older one 
that it is replacing. I argue that the new theory, which centers on 
the idea that evil involves a sort of misprioritizing, enables Kant 
to get around two problems associated with the older theory. As 
will be seen, this has implications for two main debates in the 
secondary literature: the wille-willkür debate and the debate 
about the exegetical plausibility of the so-called regress argu-
ment for the formula of humanity.  
Accordingly, my paper will be organized into three main 
sections. In section one, I will discuss the relationship between 
freedom of choice and moral good and evil as set out in Book I 
of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (R1). In 
particular, I will focus on the arguments that Kant offers to 
substantiate his claim that “the human being is by nature evil” 
(AA RGV 06:32) because I think that this claim is central to R1 
as a whole. Focusing on it will facilitate and allow a nucleation 
point for the discussion in section one. I will transition between 
sections one and two by looking at Kant’s conception of evil 
and how this allows him to claim at the beginning of R1 that 
“considered in themselves natural inclinations are good” (AA 
RGV 06:58). In section two, I will briefly outline two distinct 
but related problems that arise from Kant’s conception of 
freedom and morality in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
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Morals. I refer to these as the ‘Sidgwick problem’ and the 
‘Dignity and Worth’ problem, respectively. After articulating 
these problems, I will try to show how the theory offered in R1 
solves both of them. In discussing the Sidgwick problem, I will 
set out three distinct positions in the wille-willkür debate and 
explain where I fit in. In discussing the Dignity and Worth 
problem, I will connect my discussion up with the regress 
argument for the formula of humanity. Finally, in the third 
section of the paper, I will conclude with a brief recapitulation, 
some comments on some of the implications of this new theory, 
and an open-ended question as to what Kant’s claim about the 
human being’s propensity to evil, taken in conjunction with an 
empirical claim he makes in the introduction to R1, means for 
his theory of the highest good and the practical postulates, 
especially as this theory is outlined in the Critique of Practical 
Reason.1 
 
Section 1: the human being is by nature evil 
 
n the general introduction to RI Kant states his goal for the 
succeeding sections: “we shall say… of one of these 
characters [i.e. the good or the evil]… that it is innate in [the 
human being]” (AA RGV 06:21). However, this already raises 
a number of questions: what does it mean that the human being 
should be good (or evil) ‘innately’? Kant offers other glosses of 
his goal here: he intends to establish whether “the human being 
is by nature good… [or] he is by nature evil” (AA RGV 06:21). 
But this is useful only insofar as it hopefully will prevent us 
from getting too bogged down with particular words, like 
“innate.” What Kant means by these turns of phrase still 
                                                            
1 The text of the following footnote was added post-publication on 26/04/2014: In 
citing material from The Critique of Pure Reason, I have used the standard A and 
B pagination for the 1781 and 1787 editions respectively. All other citations of 
Immanuel Kant’s works are identified by the relevant abbreviation together with 
the volume and page number of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. All translations are 
taken from the Cambridge Blue Series of Kant’s works edited by Paul Guyer and 
Allen Wood. 
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remains unsettled. Moreover, it is prima facie implausible that 
this short list of options is exhaustive. Cannot a human being be 
both good and evil or neither good nor evil? Surely evil comes 
in degrees: someone who tells the occasional white lie cannot 
be put on a level with an Adolf Eichmann.  
 The first of these questions feeds into the second and offers 
us the first look at the connection between freedom and 
morality in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. 
Kant explains that by the “nature” of a human being he means 
“the subjective ground… of the exercise of the human being’s 
freedom in general” (AA RGV 06:21).2 In other words, though 
a human being can be good or evil by nature, he still “holds 
within himself a first ground for the adoption of good or evil… 
maxims” (AA RGV 06:21) because his freedom of choice 
precludes any “determination through natural causes” (AA 
RGV 06:21).3 Indeed, a human being, since he is free, “cannot 
be determined to any actions through any incentive except so 
far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim” 
(AA RGV 06:24). In other words, a human being is free to act 
on any maxim – the one thing that a human being cannot do is 
foreswear his/her freedom of choice (in any but a trivial 
fashion) (AA RGV 06:27). Therefore, any failure to incor-
porate the moral law into one’s maxim cannot be a negative 
failure (i.e. morally neutral) but must be considered as a positive 
failure (AA RGV 06:24)4 – and therefore when considering the 
human being as an intelligible being, s/he can be judged only 
either morally good or morally evil, not both (or neither) (AA 
RGV 06:23-25n).5 In other words, the options above are, 
indeed, exhaustive, although (as will be explained below) this 
does not entail that evil does not come in degrees.6 I will bring 
up this rigid dichotomy again in the conclusion. 
                                                            
2 See also AA RGV 06:25. 
3 See also AA RGV 06:25. 
4 For a similar reading, see Henry Allison, “On the very idea of a propensity to 
evil,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 2002, 36: 337-348. 
5 See also AA RGV 06:25-26. 
6 See also AA Vorl 27:511. 
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 Kant next presents our three predispositions to the good. The 
first is animality, “physical or merely mechanical self-love” 
(AA RGV 06:26). The second is humanity, “self-love which is 
physical and yet involves comparison” (AA RGV 06:27). The 
third is personality, “the susceptibility to respect for the moral 
law as of itself sufficient incentive to the power of choice” (AA 
RGV 06:27).7 As predispositions, these three characteristics are 
innate and cannot be represented as otherwise than innate (AA 
RGV 06:29). They are “original,” meaning that they “belong 
with necessity to the possibility of this being” (AA RGV 
06:28). However, they are still only incentives to the free power 
of choice and, therefore, even with these good predispositions, a 
good or evil character “is something that can only be acquired” 
(AA RGV 06:27). In other words, a good character is still only 
something that can be acquired by the morally correct exer-
cising of freedom of choice. This remains true despite the fact 
that all three of these predispositions (not just personality – this 
point will become important in section two of this paper) are 
“predispositions to the good (they demand compliance with it)” 
(AA RGV 06:28).  
Nonetheless, these characteristics are, according to Kant, 
necessary even for the possibility of human nature. Thus, pre-
sumably, these characteristics are contained within the concept 
of human nature on Kant’s account and can be analyzed out of 
it. In any event, Kant does not offer further proof of this part of 
his moral psychology. Let us turn, then, to Kant’s presentation 
of “the propensity to evil in human nature” (AA RGV 06:28), 
which is only contingent (AA RGV 06:29), and which is a 
moral judgment on the innate disposition of the human species. 
This is (as a moral judgment) what Kant claims in the intro-
duction to R1 that he wants to prove. 
                                                            
7 For discussions of the distinction between the predispositions to humanity and 
to personality, see Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness 
(Cambridge University Press: 2000), 192n16; or Samuel Kahn, “Reconsidering 
6:26n and the meaning of ‘humanity’,” in Kant und die Philosophie in 
weltbürgerlicher Absicht (Walter de Gruyter: 2013). 
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 At this point in the text things get more complex. First, Kant 
adds in new terminology: “the will’s capacity or incapacity 
arising from this natural propensity to adopt or not to adopt the 
moral law in its maxims can be called the good or evil heart” 
(AA RGV 06:29). This will become useful later. He next goes 
on to define the “three different grades of this natural propensity 
to evil” (AA RGV 06:29): frailty (AA RGV 06:29), impurity 
(AA RGV 06:30), and depravity (AA RGV 06:30). This is 
important because it shows that the stark binary above between 
good and evil is, on Kant’s account, consistent with the idea that 
evil comes in degrees. Even more important for my purposes is 
that it is in this section of the text that Kant claims that “the 
propensity to evil is here established (as regards actions) in the 
human being, even the best” (AA RGV 06:30). This could be 
taken to mean either that the preceding paragraphs established 
that human beings have a propensity to evil (in the sense of a 
proof), or that this propensity to evil is established in these three 
propensities in any human being (in the sense of “found,” or 
perhaps even “defined”).  
However, if it is to be the former interpretation, it is not 
entirely clear how the preceding definitions established this 
claim. Moreover, given the immediate context of this assertion, 
it seems as though the second interpretation is more reason-
able.8 That is, the sentence continues after a semicolon with a 
conditional: “if it is to be proved that the propensity to evil 
among human beings is universal…” (AA RGV 06:36). This 
indicates that Kant does not take himself to have proved that 
humans have a propensity to evil yet. Moreover, in the 
following paragraph, Kant distinguishes between juridical and 
                                                            
8 Note, however, that this does not explain the footnote at AA RGV 06:39, which 
would seem to contradict this assertion: “the appropriate proof of this sentence of 
condemnation by reason sitting in moral judgment is contained not in this section, 
but in the previous one. This section contains only the corroboration of the 
judgment through experience.” Although this could, indeed, be interpreted in 
such a way that it would be consistent with my assertion above (and the 
immediate context as well as the import of the rest of R1 (cf. e.g. the 
‘anthropological research’ quotation from the remark at the beginning of R1, 
cited below) could support such an interpretation) I hesitate to say anything 
decisive here. 
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moral goodness – i.e. actions that merely correspond to the 
“letter of the law” as opposed to actions done from respect for 
the law (AA RGV 06:30-31).9 This indicates that Kant is 
describing the ways in which evil is found in humans, not 
proving that there is some deep-seated attraction to it in our 
moral psychology. Finally, in the next section of the text, Kant 
continues as though the proof that human beings have a 
propensity to evil is yet to come – the proof of the judgment that 
human beings are evil by nature is yet to come in section three 
of the text.  
Before presenting this proof, however, Kant elucidates what 
he means by his claim: “the statement, “the human being is 
evil,” cannot mean anything else than that he is conscious of the 
moral law and yet has incorporated into his maxim the 
(occasional) deviation from it” (AA RGV 06:32). But this just 
means that the human being does not have a holy will,10 and the 
contrast between the human being and a holy will is present 
even as early as the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals 
and remains in the Critique of Practical Reason as well as in the 
Lectures on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals.11 Indeed, 
this is what underlies the difference between a practical law and 
the way that we (as human beings) cognize this practical law: as 
an imperative. On Kant’s account, the moral law in its pure 
form is cognized as such only by a divine will; we cognize the 
moral law as a constraining “ought” on our recalcitrant wills 
(AA MdS 06:222). Kant’s assertion, then, that the human being 
has a propensity to evil seems to be nothing more than that we 
are not divine wills – and this is consistent throughout his 
writing. Moreover, it seems reasonable: it is unlikely that any-
one would dispute the claim that we are not omnibenevolent. 
                                                            
9 See also the second paragraph following the ‘establishment’ assertion: “the 
following elucidation is also necessary in order to define the concept of this 
propensity” (AA RGV 06:31, my emphasis). 
10 For an alternative reading, see Pablo Muchnik, “On the alleged vacuity of 
Kant’s concept of evil,” Kant-Studien 2006, 97 (4): 430-451. 
11 See, e.g., AA GMS 04:397, 413, 426, 434, 439, 449; AA KpV 05:25, 32, 82; 
AA Vorl 27:489; AA MdS 06:222, etc. 
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But reasonable is not grounds for a formal proof, and we 
must therefore wonder why Kant claims that “we can spare 
ourselves the formal proof that there must be such a corrupt 
propensity rooted in the human being in view of the multitude 
of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades 
before us” (AA RGV 06:32-33). Perhaps he thought that his 
‘formal proof’ (if, indeed, such a proof is even possible) might 
be misconstrued as proving that this evil is necessary in human 
beings in the sense that it cannot be avoided though it can still 
be imputed. The worry would be that in light of such a proof, 
this propensity to evil might come to be regarded as grounds for 
asserting the futility of attempting to follow the rigid moral law 
and, thus, be grounds for compromising if not totally abrogating 
(since the first might indeed constitute the second insofar as the 
second is possible – more on this in section two of this paper) 
the moral law.12 But Kant does not rest his omission of this 
proof on moralistic grounds: he explicitly states that this formal 
proof is unnecessary. How does he justify this claim? 
 Kant’s reasoning for the sufficiency of an empirical proof 
of his claim lies in the preceding section where he claims that  
 
… the propensity to evil is a deed in the first meaning 
(peccatum originarium),[13] and at the same time the 
formal ground of every deed contrary to law according to 
the second meaning…[14] that resists the law materially 
(AA RGV 06:31). 
 
In other words, the propensity is imputable insofar as it is a 
“deed.” It is a “decision” made outside of time, and it is also the 
ground for any “woeful…human deeds” (AA RGV 06:33). 
                                                            
12 See, e.g., AA RGV 06:51-52 and AA GMS 04:405. 
13 When he says “first meaning,” Kant is referring to something he said 
immediately earlier in the text: “a subjective determining ground of the power of 
choice that precedes every deed” (AA RGV 06:31). 
14 When he says “second meaning,” Kant is referring to something he said 
immediately earlier in the text: “the use of freedom through which the supreme 
maxim… is adopted in the power of choice… by which… actions themselves… 
are performed according to maxims” (AA RGV 06:31). 
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Moreover, because each deed is to be considered a free action,15 
in seeking its rational ground we can find it only in a propensity 
to evil. That is, any empirical evidence of action contrary to law 
is instantiation for the claim that the agent does not have a holy 
will (but not vice versa).  
Kant recognizes that this proof is only empirical and, 
therefore, somewhat unsatisfactory. We cannot ever properly 
deduce someone’s (even our own) maxims from anything, so 
we cannot properly deduce evil maxims from empirical 
actions.16 Indeed, at AA RGV 06:37 he himself claims that “if a 
propensity to this does lie in human nature” – a conditional, not 
an indicative – and he himself observes at AA RGV 06:38-39 
that “everyone can decide by himself” whether humans are by 
nature evil. However, at this point we might realize that a 
formal proof is unnecessary for what Kant wants to do. This 
propensity is contingent, not necessary.17 Thus, all that Kant 
needed to show was that 1. we have a predisposition to the good 
(what this means and why Kant needs to argue this will be 
addressed in section two) and 2. that given this predisposition to 
the good, his theory can accommodate both evil and good dis-
positions and, moreover, that both of these can be imputable.18 
As he states in the remark at the beginning of R1: “[whether or 
not humans are by nature good or evil will be demonstrated 
later] if it transpires from anthropological research that the 
                                                            
15 “[E]very evil action must be so considered… as if the human being had just 
fallen into it directly from the state of innocence” (AA RGV 06:41). 
16 This kind of claim is familiar from the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
Morals (AA GMS 04:390, 406-407). But it also shows up in the Critique of 
Practical Reason (AA KpV 05:47, 81) and the Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason (AA RGV 06:21). 
17 The contingency of actual evil is discussed in some detail in Paul Formosa, 
“Kant on the radical evil in human nature,” Philosophical Forum 2007, 38 (3): 
221–245. McMullin claims that radical evil is necessary for the transition into 
agency (which Kant refers to as the transition toward Mündigkeit in his essay 
What is Enlightenment), arguing that this kind of necessity does not compromise 
its imputability (Irene McMullin, “Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral 
Responsibility,” Kantian Review 2013, 18 (1): 49-72).  
18 For an alternative reading, see Seiriol Morgan, “The missing formal proof of 
humanity’s radical evil in Kant’s religion,” Philosophical Review 2005, 114 (1): 
63-114. 
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grounds that justify us in attributing one of these two characters 
to a human being as innate are of such a nature that there is no 
cause for exempting anyone from it, and that the character 
therefore applies to the species” (AA RGV 06:25-26, my em-
phasis). The point here seems to be that anthropological 
research will be needed to establish the reliability of the infer-
ence of bad maxims from the existence of bad actions.19 Per-
haps Kant’s idea is that only empirical research will be able to 
establish whether humans are sufficiently similar to warrant the 
kind of “maxim guessing” that most of us do on an everyday 
basis without even thinking about it, even when our conclusions 
shed a negative light on the moral characters of our inter-
locutors.20  
Having accomplished this goal insofar as he had set out to 
(even if it rests on an empirical proof, we were told that it would 
from the beginning of R1) only two short tasks remain for Kant 
in R1: (1) to explain how this evil originated in such a way that 
it can still be imputed to the agent, and (2) to explain what his 
conception of evil involves. I will briefly discuss both of these 
before transitioning into section two of this paper. 
Because the origin of evil in human nature must be imput-
able on Kant’s account, it cannot be determined by laws of 
nature. Rather, it must be “bound… according to laws of 
freedom” (AA RGV 06:39), which means that “it cannot be 
derived from some preceding state or other” (AA RGV 06:39-
40). The idea of a temporal origin of free actions and, therefore, 
of the propensity to evil is thus contradictory (AA RGV 06:40): 
the “ground of the exercise of freedom… must be sought in the 
representations of reason alone” (AA RGV 06:40). However, 
                                                            
19 This kind of inference (and its presence in the Religion within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason) is discussed at length in Carl Manrique, “Radical Evil and the 
invisibility of moral worth in Kant’s de Religion,” Ideas y valores 2007, 56 (135): 
3-27. 
20 Here I agree with Grimm, who thinks that Kant’s case for radical evil is 
anthropological at heart (Stephen R. Grimm, “Kant’s argument for radical evil,” 
European Journal of Philosophy 2002, 10 (2): 160–177. For an alternative 
account, see, e.g., Stephen Palmquist, “Kant’s quasi-transcendental argument for 
a necessary and universal evil propensity in human nature,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 2008, 46 (2): 261-297). 
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since we have a predisposition to the good, there is “no 
conceivable ground for us… from which moral evil could first 
have come in us” (AA RGV 06:43). We are, indeed, left in the 
dark in regard to this, but we are still to hold a person who 
commits an evil deed “at the moment of action just as 
accountable… as if… he had just stepped out of the state of 
innocence into evil” (AA RGV 06:41). Since we “cannot 
inquire into the origin in time of this deed” (AA RGV 06:41) 
we must “inquire only into its origin in reason” (AA RGV 
06:41). And just what is this origin – what is it that evil actually 
involves on Kant’s view?  
Kant tells us that “[w]hether the human being is good or evil, 
must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he 
incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the maxim) 
but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim): which of 
the two he makes the condition of the other” (AA RGV 06:36). 
The two incentives here are the incentive of self-love and the 
incentive of morality (i.e. the moral law). Whether somebody is 
good or evil, then, depends not simply on whether they gratify 
the incentives of self-love or not. It depends on the way in 
which these incentives are gratified. If they are given superior 
weight than the moral law – if the moral law is fulfilled only 
conditionally based on the incentive of self-love – then the 
human being is evil. If, in contradistinction, the moral law is 
made the condition of fulfilling any incentive of self-love – if 
duty is always performed first and foremost – then the human 
being is good. In other words, “inclinations only make more 
difficult the execution of the good maxims opposing them; 
whereas genuine evil consists in our will not to resist the 
inclination when they invite transgression” (AA RGV 06:59n): 
the evil is not to be sought in inclinations and, therefore, in 
contrast to the stoics (as Kant portrays them), Kant would not 
have us eliminate them. Kant thinks that the correct response to 
the pull of the inclinations is to subordinate them to the moral 
law rather than to (try to) crush them into nonexistence. 
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It is this that underlies Kant’s claim at AA RGV 06:58, at the 
opening of book II of the Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason, that “considered in themselves natural inclin-
ations are good” and that to extirpate them would thus be both 
“harmful and blameworthy” (AA RGV 06:41). This seems to 
be in keeping with what Kant claimed earlier – that all three 
predispositions (not just personality) promote the good (AA 
RGV 06:28 (cited above)). However, this claim might be 
somewhat misleading: Kant is not claiming that the inclinations 
are unconditionally good, much less that their fulfillment is. He 
is not claiming that there is, in the inclinations, as in a good will, 
an incommensurate, absolute worth that is good in any and all 
situations. Rather, he is claiming that “other things being equal, 
the fulfillment of human inclinations can be assumed to be a 
part of what is good for human beings.”21 What is key is the 
“other things being equal” clause: we are not, of course, 
supposed to subordinate the moral law to this goal, but this does 
not mean that we cannot pursue it. In other words, the inclin-
ations and the pursuit of happiness are not merely instru-
mentally good – but they are nonetheless not unconditionally 
good.22 
 
Section 2: some problems in need of reconciliation 
 
ased on the previous section, it can be seen that in the 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, moral 
evil is a “radical innate evil in human nature” (AA 
RGV 06:32) because it is an evil of free choice: it is imputable. 
The grounds of this evil are thus not to be sought in a “sensuous 
nature” (AA RGV 06:34-35) because these “bear no direct 
relation to evil” (AA RGV 06:35). A human’s inclinations are, 
in a sense, outside of the realm of good and evil because they 
are outside of freedom and, thus, outside of the moral law and 
                                                            
21 Cf. Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge University 
Press: 2000), p. 224. 
22 Cf. Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press: 1999), 
section 9.4. 
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therefore the basis of any moral value judgment. Moreover, we 
“cannot presume ourselves responsible for their existence” (AA 
RGV 06:35); they are not imputable because they are outside of 
our sphere of action as free beings. We can, indeed, decide 
whether or not to subordinate our inclinations to the moral law, 
but we cannot decide (in any nontrivial fashion) not to have 
natural inclinations – and this is not a bad thing because the 
natural inclinations are not, in themselves, the ground of evil.  
However, in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, 
the picture seems to be somewhat different. As Rawls notes in 
Kant IX,23 when Kant is speaking of the “hardened criminal” in 
section III of the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, he 
states that  
 
This better person, however, he believes himself to be 
when he transports himself into the standpoint of a 
member of the world of understanding, to which the idea 
of freedom, i.e., independence of determining causes of 
the sensible world, involuntarily necessitates him, and in 
which he is conscious of good will, which constitutes by 
his own admission the law for his evil will as a member of 
the sensible world, the law with whose authority he 
becomes acquainted when he transgresses it. The moral 
‘ought’ is thus his own necessary volition as a member of 
an intelligible world and is thought of by him as an 
‘ought’ only insofar as he at the same time considers 
himself as a member of the sensible world (AA GMS 
04:454-455). 
 
According to this passage, the moral, “I ought” becomes an 
indicative, “I will,” in the world of the understanding. But this 
                                                            
23 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Harvard University 
Press: 2000), p. 303. This issue is discussed by many other commentators, too. 
See, for example, Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge 
University Press: 1990); Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason (University of Chicago Press: 1960); Robert Louden, Kant’s 
Impure Ethics (Oxford University Press: 2000); or H. J. Patton, The Categorical 
Imperative (University of Pennsylvania Press: 1971). 
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leaves a person qua intelligible being no choice but to be good. 
More problematic still, a person qua sensible being is entirely 
driven by causal impulses that are beyond his/her control. This 
is in line with what Kant says in section II of the Groundwork 
for a Metaphysics of Morals: “the inclinations themselves, 
however, as sources of needs, are so little of absolute worth… 
that rather to be entirely free of them must be the universal wish 
of every rational being” (AA GMS 04:428). Indeed, even in 
section I we find Kant pitting reason directly against the 
inclinations and happiness: the exercise of reason gives rise to 
“misology” (hatred of reason) because the more it is used “the 
more the human being falls short of true contentment” (AA 
GMS 04:395).  
It is from these kinds of claims that what I have called the 
“Sidgwick problem” (in the introduction to this paper) comes.24 
One way to think about this is as follows. Since “everything in 
nature works in accordance with laws” (AA GMS 04:412), 
considering myself as a sensible being, no evil can be imputed 
to me. But in the intelligible world, the law of freedom is now a 
causal acausal law and so, considering myself as an intelligible 
being, no evil can be imputed to me. Therefore, considering 
myself either as a member of the world of the understanding or 
as a member of the world of nature I can be neither good nor 
evil since, even if I am following the moral law, my actions 
cannot be imputed to me.25  
                                                            
24 Korsgaard raises a similar problem in chapter 7 of Creating the Kingdom of 
Ends (Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge 
University Press: 1996), chpt. 7). She points out that based on the account in the 
Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, an all or nothing dilemma arises: 
considered as noumena, agents are responsible for all of their actions, whereas 
considered as phenomena, agents are not responsible for any of their actions. 
According to Korsgaard, this is counterintuitive. It is counterintuitive because 
sometimes we excuse agents for one or more actions on empirical grounds, and 
we do not think that this in any way compromises their agenthood. Although this 
problem is slightly different from what I am calling the “Sidgwick problem” 
above, hopefully it is clear that both problems derive from the same root. 
25 See also AA KpV 05:87, where Kant seems to make a similar claim in the 
Critique of Practical Reason. 
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I have called this the “Sidgwick problem” because Henry 
Sidgwick articulated it in The Methods of Ethics. It should be 
noted that Reinhold raised almost exactly the same problem a 
century earlier. However, when Reinhold pointed out this prob-
lem, it was not addressed primarily to Kant or Kant’s philo-
sophy per se. Rather, Reinhold thought the problem arose 
because of a misinterpretation of Kant that was facilitated by 
someone else: Schmid. To explain, Schmid had published a 
Kant lexicon in which he defined freedom as “dependency of 
the will on reason that immediately determines it.”26 Reinhold 
pointed out that this entails that immoral actions are not free 
and, thus, are not imputable, which is absurd. However, 
Reinhold argued that the absurdity lay in Schmid’s definition 
rather than in Kant: Schmid had given an incorrect definition of 
Kant’s concept of freedom. In other words, Reinhold argued 
that Schmid had misunderstood Kant’s account.27  
Sidgwick, by way of contrast, poses the problem directly to 
Kant. He argues that Kant makes a mistake because “the life of 
the saint must be just as much subject – in any particular portion 
of it – to the necessary laws of physical causation as the life of 
the scoundrel.”28 In other words, according to Sidgwick at least 
some things Kant says in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
Morals (and the Critique of Practical Reason) seem to entail 
that Kant’s ideas about freedom at this point require more 
working out. And this should be unsurprising: Kant’s first 
mature stab at the problem of free will had come only a few 
years earlier – in 1781 in the third antinomy of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. At that point, Kant did not anticipate having to 
write anything like the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
                                                            
26 The following attributions were added post-publication on 26/04/2014: This 
translation from M. Schmid, Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen 
Schriften, 2nd, expanded, edn. Jena. 1788: p.223, is by Courtney Fugate. See also 
Courtney Fugate’s full discussion in his article, “On a supposed solution to the 
Reinhold/Sidgwick problem in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, The European 
Journal of Philosophy (Virtual Issue: 2012). 
27 Karl Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, edited by Karl Ameriks and 
translated by James Hebbeler (Cambridge University Press: 1995). 
28 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition (Hackett: 1981), p. 516. 
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Morals. Similarly, when Kant wrote the Groundwork for a 
Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, he did not anticipate having to 
write the Critique of Practical Reason – which he nonetheless 
published only three years later.  
Kant’s moral philosophy, like much of his philosophy, was 
not developed according to a pre-existing, fully worked out 
plan. As we have seen already, Kant corrects for the Sidgwick 
problem in R1 by making evil arise out of freedom of choice. 
Evil arises out of a misprioritization rather than out of our 
sensuous nature directly because if it arose out of our sensuous 
nature directly – out of our natural inclinations – then it would 
not be imputable. It is certainly true that the seeds for this theory 
can be found already in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
Morals. For example, in the opening lines of section III of the 
Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes 
between two different kinds of freedom, negative freedom and 
positive freedom.29 Perhaps it was working this distinction out 
that led him to the theory he sets out in R1.  But the point is that 
he does not work this distinction out – he does not use this 
distinction to good effect – at the time of the Groundwork for a 
Metaphysics of Morals.30 The point is that in 1785, these ideas 
are mixed with other ideas, ideas about the causality of reason 
and of inclination, ideas that are ultimately dropped. Indeed, the 
theory of evil that Kant begins developing in the Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason does not seem to reach fruition 
until 1797, when Kant published the Metaphysics of Morals, in 
which he argues that some parts of our sensuous nature are just 
as necessary for morality as the faculty of reason.31 
Before turning away from the Sidgwick problem, I want to 
indicate where I fit into the broader debate under which 
discussion of this problem usually falls: the wille-willkür 
debate. According to one group of commentators, the Sidgwick 
                                                            
29 AA GMS 04:446-447. 
30 For a similar reading, see Matthew Caswell, “The value of humanity and 
Kant’s conception of evil,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (44.4, 2006): 
635-663. 
31 See, e.g., AA MdS 06:399-403. 
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problem arises from the simple fact that Kant had not develop-
ed the correct terminology to talk about his position until the 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and, even more 
so, the Metaphysics of Morals. These commentators argue that 
the account of immoral behavior (and the account of freedom it 
presupposes) that was laid out in the previous section of this 
paper is latent throughout Kant’s corpus even though it was not 
made explicit until some of his later works. Thus, these com-
mentators think that Schmid misinterpreted Kant, that Sidgwick 
did, too, and that Reinhold (and 1790s Kant) set things aright.32 
According to a second group of commentators, this first 
group is incorrect. They argue that, in fact, Schmid had things 
right all along: freedom and morality do go hand in hand. 
Moreover, this is not so merely for the Groundwork for a 
Metaphysics of Morals and for the Critique of Practical 
Reason. This is so also for the Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason and for the Metaphysics of Morals. These 
commentators argue that evil is not merely unimputable; it is 
inconceivable. The solution to the puzzle is not located in 
redefining freedom. Instead, the solution to the puzzle is that 
Kant wants to redefine evil: evil is not acting according to 
inclination or elevating an immoral maxim to the status of a 
universal law. Rather, evil is making an exception of oneself to 
a law that one recognizes as authoritative. Moreover, these 
commentators argue that this is what Kant was saying all along. 
Reinhold messed things up because, by virtue of misunder-
standing Kant’s account of the nature of evil, he posed a 
pseudoproblem. Sidgwick did the same.33 
I am dubious of both of these positions. As I noted above, I 
would agree with the first group of commentators that there are 
passages in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals and 
the Critique of Practical Reason that support the idea that 
                                                            
32 See, for example, Nelson Potter, Jr., “Does Kant have two concepts of 
freedom?” Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongress (de Gruyter: 1974). 
33 Courtney Fugate, “On a supposed solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick problem 
in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,” The European Journal of Philosophy (Virtual 
Issue: 2012). 
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Schmid and Sidgwick misinterpreted Kant.34 However, there 
are also passages (like the one reproduced above) that suggest 
otherwise.35So I think that the first position is too extreme. But I 
think the second position is too extreme, too. It is certainly true 
that there are passages in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
Morals and in the Critique of Practical Reason that suggest that 
Kant’s early account of evil was more complex than the 
Sidgwick problem would require.36It also seems plausible that 
there are parts of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason and of the Metaphysics of Morals that suggest that a 
will is free if and only if it is moral.37 However, this requires 
overlooking the passages in which evil is traced back to inclin-
ations acting by causal laws. Moreover, I think the “solution” 
posed by the second position does not work: if the equation of 
freedom and morality is accepted, it does not matter how evil is 
defined. That is, provided that freedom is taken to be a 
                                                            
34 One of the more important texts to which proponents of this interpretation point 
comes from the Critique of the Power of Judgment: “I deliberately say “under 
moral laws.” The final end of creation is not the human being in accordance with 
moral laws, i.e., one who behaves in accordance with them” (AA KU 05:448n-
449n). The idea is that in this passage Kant distinguishes between being under 
moral laws and acting in accordance with moral laws. This suggests that one can 
be under moral laws (i.e., be subject to moral laws) without acting in accordance 
with them. This is relevant because even in his earlier work Kant sometimes says 
that a free will is one that is under moral laws. This supports the idea that Kant 
never intended to say that a will is free if but only if it acts according to moral 
laws, evil if but only if it acts according to causal laws. 
 Fugate, who belongs to the second group of commentators, objects to the use 
of this passage in this debate. He argues that “[s]ince the very reason Kant gives 
for using ‘under’ instead of ‘according to’ in this passage is to put a limit on how 
much nature can be responsible for our moral status and not on how much we 
can, it provides no direct support for any claim about how freedom is related to 
the law” (Courtney Fugate, “On a supposed solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick 
problem in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,” The European Journal of Philosophy 
(Virtual Issue: 2012), pp. 3-4). Although I do not agree with the first group of 
commentators (against whom Fugate is arguing), I think that Fugate misses the 
mark here. It really does not matter that in this footnote Kant is talking about how 
much nature can be responsible for with regard to our moral status. The point is 
simply that in this footnote, Kant distinguishes between being under moral laws 
and acting according to them, which suggests that it is possible to be under them 
while nonetheless not acting according to them. 
35 In addition to the passages cited above, see AA KpV 05:29, 33, 78, 96 or 98. 
36 See, e.g., AA GMS 04:424. 
37 See, e.g., AA MdS 06:382n. 
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precondition of imputability (which Fugate, the primary pro-
ponent of the second position, explicitly accepts)38 the equation 
of freedom and morality entails that evil is not imputable 
regardless of its definition. So redefining evil is a nonstarter. 
Thus, I align myself with a third group of commentators, 
whom I take to be more moderate.39 Basically, the idea is that 
the texts are ambivalent. Sometimes, especially in his earlier 
writing (the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Critique of Practical Reason), Kant says that on the one hand, 
freedom and morality go together, and on the other hand, evil 
and being causally determined by inclinations go together. That 
is, sometimes the texts suggest that Kant steps directly into the 
trap of the Sidgwick problem. Other times, especially in his 
later writing (the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals) Kant suggests that the 
inclinations are actually important for moral behavior just as 
much as for immoral behavior; thus, sometimes the texts 
suggest that Kant neatly sidesteps the Sidgwick problem, saying 
that negative freedom (the capacity for acting according to the 
moral law) and imputability go together and evil arises not 
directly from the inclinations but rather from a free choice that 
involves a misprioritization, an elevation of self-love over the 
moral law. 
Closely related to the Sidgwick problem is what I have called 
the “Dignity and Worth” problem. In elucidating why good and 
evil must arise out of free choice in subordinating our incentives 
in our maxims, Kant also claims that the ground of evil cannot 
lie “in a corruption of the morally legislative reason, as if reason 
could extirpate within itself the dignity of the law itself” (AA 
RGV 06:35). In other words, our personality – “the suscept-
ibility to respect for the moral law as of itself sufficient incentive 
to the power of choice” (AA RGV 06:27) – cannot have any 
                                                            
38 Courtney Fugate, “On a supposed solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick problem 
in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,” The European Journal of Philosophy (Virtual 
Issue: 2012), pp. 17ff. 
39 In this I take myself to be following more or less in the footsteps of Rawls, 
Wood and others. 
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evil grafted onto it. We cannot, as Wood observes,40 as Lucifer 
in Milton’s Paradise Lost, declare, “evil, be thou my good” (IV, 
108) because this would mean that we were no longer subject to 
the moral law. We cannot be a  “diabolical being” because this 
is simply inconceivable since it “would amount to a cause 
operating without any law at all… [which] is a contradiction” 
(AA RGV 06:35). And thus how are we to represent evil? Since 
evil arises from freedom of choice (thus not sensible nature or, 
as we have just seen, a corruption of our intelligible nature), evil 
should be named “perversity of the heart, and this heart is then 
called evil because of what results. An evil heart can coexist 
with a will which in the abstract is good” (AA RGV 06:37). 
And how does this fix some earlier problem in the Groundwork 
for a Metaphysics of Morals? 
Kant opens section I of the Groundwork of a Metaphysics of 
Morals with his famous claim that “there is nothing it is 
possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything 
at all outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation 
excepting only a good will” (AA GMS 04:393). But the most 
natural way of interpreting this is as an emphatic claim that our 
worth – our dignity – is, in fact, contingent on our being 
morally good. That is, if a good will is good without limitation, 
then a person with a good will has something good without 
limitation. Thus, it seems, a morally good person has absolute 
worth and dignity. But if nothing other than a good will is good 
without limitation, then a person who does not have a good will 
has nothing that is good without limitation. Thus, it seems, an 
evil person does not have absolute worth or dignity. 
In section II, Kant seems to say otherwise when he posits his 
formula of humanity, which is grounded on the absolute worth 
of a human being qua person. But he goes on to claim that we 
all have an incommensurable dignity that arises from “the 
idea… of a rational being that obeys no law except that which 
at the same time it gives itself” (AA GMS 04:434). Given that 
                                                            
40 Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press: 1999), 
p.373n3. 
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in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals Kant seems to 
think that an agent gives a law to him/herself only if s/he is 
acting morally (AA GMS 04:440-442), the most natural way of 
interpreting this is, again, as a claim that our dignity is founded 
on our rationality – actual rationality, not capacity for 
rationality. Indeed, even as late as the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment Kant seems to advance ideas that are consistent with 
this: “only through that which he does without regard to 
enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of that which 
nature could passively provide for him, does he give his being 
as the existence of a person an absolute value” (AA KU 
05:208-209). 
There are ways in which one could try to massage these 
value claims into consistency. For example, Korsgaard argues 
that the value of the capacity for rationality is linked to the value 
of rationality because the capacity for rationality, “completed 
and perfected,” becomes rationality.41 This link seems un-
deniably true on Kant’s account. Nonetheless, as a “rescue 
attempt,” this seems doomed to failure: there seems very little 
doubt that in the passages noted above, if the bare capacity for 
rationality has value, this value is derivative of actual 
rationality. Perhaps this “massaging” of the texts also requires 
some looking away. One thing that this reveals is that 
Korsgaard’s famous regress argument, which makes the value 
of the capacity for rationality logically prior to the value of 
rationality, is, at least from an exegetical perspective, 
oversimplified.42 Indeed, in recent work commentators like 
Kerstein have taken Korsgaard to task on exactly this front, 
arguing that a better interpretation of Kant’s argument for the 
formula of humanity at AA GMS 04:428-429 yields the duty 
                                                            
41 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University 
Press: 1996), p. 114. 
42 I argue that the regress argument requires eschewing the distinction between 
culpable and nonculpable ignorance in my Samuel Kahn, “The Guise of the 
Objectively Good,” The Journal of Value Inquiry (47.1-2 (June 2013)): 87-99. 
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always to treat rationality (rather than the capacity for 
rationality) as an end and never merely as a means.43 
However, my goal here is not to get involved in disputes 
about Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity. Rather, I 
want simply to point out that in R1 Kant has gotten around once 
and for all the problem raised by the famous first line of the 
Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals: in R1, he claims that 
we always have a good will (albeit only in the abstract). What is 
at question is, rather, whether we have a good heart. Moreover, 
since we always have a good will, our dignity (and, thus, our 
place in the formula of humanity as absolute ends) always 
remains intact regardless of our virtue or viciousness: our 
absolute worth is not, in point of fact, dependent on whether or 
not we are morally good. Rather, we always have worth 
through our possession of a good will in the abstract, even when 
we have an evil heart. And then what is this “good will in the 
abstract,” this worth of personality, in fact based on? It seems it 
can be nothing other than the capacity for autonomy and 
positive freedom (AA RGV 06:223). 
 
Section 3: conclusion 
 
o recapitulate, in R1 Kant offers a conception of free-
dom of choice whereby we have a predisposition to 
good and a propensity to evil. In so doing, he claims that 
moral good or evil arises not out of either our sensible or our 
intelligible nature per se – rather, it arises out of our freedom of 
choice directly: we are good if we subordinate our natural 
inclinations to the moral law and evil if we subordinate the 
moral law to our natural inclinations. He claimed to show from 
anthropological research that we have a propensity to evil. 
However, this propensity is only a contingent disposition in us; 
it still arises from freedom of choice and is still imputable. 
                                                            
43 Samuel Kerstein, “Deriving the Formula of Humanity (GMS II, 427-437),” in 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Walter de Gruyter: 2006). 
T 
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Moreover, what is at question is not whether or not we have a 
good will – it is whether or not we have a good heart.  
By avoiding making sensible nature in itself the ground of 
evil and intelligible nature the ground of good (as he seems to 
do in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals), Kant 
avoids two closely related but nonetheless distinct problems: the 
Sidgwick problem and what I have called the Dignity and 
Worth problem. If we are evil it does not come from our being 
determined by sensibility – it comes from our subordination of 
the moral law to sensibility. Thus evil (and goodness) is 
imputable. Moreover, even if we are evil this does not com-
promise our absolute worth as human beings: our dignity is 
incommensurable and we preserve our status as absolute ends 
because we always have a good will (even if only in the 
abstract) because this is based on the ideas of freedom and 
autonomy – things that we simply cannot (in any nontrivial 
fashion) forego.  
This being said, we might still object to Kant’s view on 
another ground. We might wonder, if human beings do have a 
contingent propensity to evil – if Kant’s empirical claims are 
accurate – and if, as Kant claims in the introduction to R1, we 
can claim empirically that the “history of the world attests too 
powerfully against [the view that the human species is 
improving morally]” (AA RGV 06:19), what does this mean 
for Kant’s arguments for the practical postulates as posited in, 
for example, the Critique of Practical Reason?44 Let me 
explain. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that we 
have a moral duty to promote a world in which everyone is 
maximally virtuous and in which happiness is distributed in 
accordance with virtue. Because we ought to do this, we must 
be able to do so. But in order to do so rationally, we must take 
such a world to be not merely logically possible (i.e. free of 
internal contradiction) but also really possible (i.e. to have a 
                                                            
44 The beginnings of this connection are discussed in Matthew Caswell, “Kant’s 
conception of the highest good, the Gesinnung, and the Theory of Radical Evil,” 
Kant-Studien 2006, 97 (2): 184-209. 
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ground in reality). For example, I take perpetual motion 
machines to be logically possible. However, it would be 
irrational for me to try to build one because I do not take them 
to be really possible (quite the contrary: I take them to violate 
plausible physical laws, like the 2nd law of thermodynamics). 
This is relevant here because in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, Kant claims that we must assume that we are immortal 
in order to make rational the pursuit of perfect virtue (which, 
because of our sensuous nature, because of our inclinations, can 
be attained only in an infinite amount of time) and that there is a 
God in order to make rational the pursuit of a world in which 
happiness is distributed in accordance with virtue (AA KpV 
05:120).45 In particular, the pursuit of such a world requires 
belief in the existence of a God who is omnipotent, omniscient 
and omnibenevolent in order to ensure that this God is aware of 
as well as able and willing to correct all mistakes in the 
distribution.46 
The discussion in this paper raises two questions about this 
argument, one for each of the practical postulates. These 
questions cannot be discussed thoroughly here. But in the last 
paragraphs of this paper, I would like to gesture toward them. 
The question for the postulate of immortality is whether it is 
necessary. That is, given Kant’s change in the Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason – given that he no longer views 
the pursuit of morality as a striving against and perhaps even as 
a seeking to extirpate the inclinations – given that he now views 
the pursuit of morality as a seeking merely to subordinate the 
inclinations to the moral law – it is entirely unclear why perfect 
virtue could not be attained in the normal course of a human 
life. This is not to say that it ever is attained in the normal 
course of a human life. It is simply to say that it is unclear why 
                                                            
45 The argument for the practical postulates in the “Canon of Pure Reason” 
chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is largely the same although it differs in 
the details. In particular, the reasons why immortality and God must be assumed 
to make the pursuit of the highest good rational are slightly different. But I cannot 
pursue these details here. 
46 For a thorough discussion of Kant’s practical postulates, see Allen Wood, 
Kant’s Moral Religion (Cornell University Press: 1968). 
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it should not be, which seems to render the postulate of 
immortality moot. Indeed, this might explain the conspicuous 
absence of any discussion of immortality in Kant’s discussion 
of the practical postulates in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, published only shortly before Kant wrote the 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason – or in the 
doctrine of method of the Metaphysics of Morals (which does 
hint at the postulate of the existence of God).47 
The question for the postulate of the existence of God is 
whether it is sufficient. That is, given that a moral disposition is 
now within our reach and yet, if appearances be trusted, so 
rarely achieved, we might come to believe that even if there is a 
supernatural deity, this deity is not much concerned with our 
petty grievances or with the advancement of our all too human 
conception of the highest good. This might explain why, begin-
ning with the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant seems to 
edge away from the postulate of the existence of God, an 
“edging” that is carried still further in the Metaphysics of 
Morals and the Opus Postumum. However, I cannot discuss 
these questions in detail here. 
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